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Thispapersetsouttoanalysethreediﬀerentacademicproposalsforaddressingtheneedsofthepoorinrelationto
new,ratherthan‘essential’medicines.Itfocusesparticularlyon(1)researchanddevelopment(R&D)prizefunds,(2)
a health impact fund (HIF) system and (3) a multilateral treaty on health technology cost-eﬀectiveness evaluation
andcompetitivetender.Itcomparestheextenttowhicheachrespondstothe‘marketfundamentalist’philosophy
(that we maintain forms a loose theoretical background for the patent-driven approach to pharmaceutical R&D)
and begins to analyse their respective strengths and weaknesses.
Summary
Themoralandpracticalproblemofhowpoorpeoplewill
continue to gain affordable access to medicines is one of
themostpressingissuescurrentlyconfrontinghumanity.
This is not just because of the large numbers of people,
in both developed and developing nations who we now
have good evidence are dying prematurely for lack of
such access (particularly in groups such as children
and the elderly). It is also an urgent issue because the
regulatory incentives for pharmaceutical research and
development (R&D), which particularly include domes-
ticpatentregimesandintellectualpropertyprovisionsin
international trade agreements do not favour an output
focus directly related to impact on the global burden of
disease (GBD).
Thispapersetsouttoanalysethreedifferentacademic
proposalsforaddressingthissituationinrelationtonew,
rather than ‘essential’, medicines. It focuses particularly
on(1)researchanddevelopmentprizefunds,(2)ahealth
impact fund (HIF) system and (3) a multilateral treaty
on health technology cost-effectiveness evaluation and
competitive tender. It compares the extent to which each
respondstothe‘marketfundamentalist’philosophy(that
wemaintainformsaloosetheoreticalbackgroundforthe
patent-drivenapproachtopharmaceuticalR&D)andbe-
ginstoanalysetheirrespectivestrengthsandweaknesses.
Introduction
Signiﬁcant concern now exists that the global system
for researching and developing pharmaceuticals is not
focused on relieving the global burden of disease and
the health needs of the chronically poor. Amongst the
main factors responsible are domestic patent regimes
and the intellectual property provisions of international
trade agreements (Hilary, 2001; Farmer, 2003; Shaffer
and Brenner, 2004; Angell, 2005). The term ‘chronically
poor’referstothosepeoplepredictedtoremainimpover-
ished despite (or because of), the putative effects of cor-
porateglobalisation.Thisisnotadeﬁnitiontowhichpre-
cise numerical data can readily be attached, but serves a
usefulroleinframingtheconceptualdebatethatfollows.
In this context, there appears to be a fundamental
disagreement amongst government policy-makers be-
tween two social philosophies, each of which is often
supported before the public on the basis of their respec-
tiveversionofethicalreasoning(thisisbecomingincreas-
ingly synonymous at the global level with international
human rights reasoning). The ﬁrst philosophy, referred
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to here as ‘market fundamentalism’ and promoted by
lobbyists and apologists for multinational pharmaceu-
tical companies, holds that it is almost an overarch-
ing social good that pharmaceutical companies should
be legally permitted to enjoy market monopolies over
products for which they own patents. This is consid-
ered by such industry representatives to be an ethical
pointofviewinthatitupholdstheethicalprinciplesthat
an innovator should get a fair reward, that society al-
ways beneﬁts whenever investment is promoted regard-
less of the trade-offs in diminished public goods that
sometimes have to be made. Related arguments concern
so-called alleged ‘free-riding’ on developed nation R&D
(MacDonald, 2006). Attempts by governments to con-
strain the activities of pharmaceutical corporations in
the public interest can be criticised, according to the
same canons, as an assault on freedom of action in the
market that inhibits competition, innovation, economic
growth and employment.
The second competing philosophy holds that the pro-
vision of medicines should be organized to serve public
health and the global poor. The ethical justiﬁcation for
this is frequently rooted in appeals to the importance of
universalvaluingofthesocialvirtueofrespectforhuman
dignity as increasingly conceptualised in international
human rights norms (Sen, 1999; MacDonald, 2006).
One recent example of the ﬁrst ‘market fundamental-
ist’ social philosophy in practice in this context concerns
certainrecentmultilateralandbilateraltradeagreements
that have achieved notoriety in academic circles for in-
cluding provisions aimed at removing or altering do-
mestic medicines policies that facilitate access to essen-
tial medicines by the poor; the rationale being that they
are ‘unnecessarily restrictive non-tariff barriers to trade’
(Faunce, 2005; Shaffer et al., 2005).
These trade agreements also restrict government’s ca-
pacity to stockpile and compulsorily licence patented
and otherwise prohibitively expensive vaccines in pub-
lic health emergencies (Faunce, 2005). Such emergen-
cies could include those created by pandemic inﬂuenza
or bioterrorist attack, as well as HIV/AIDS, multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis and malaria. While increasing
claims to corporate monopoly privileges over intellec-
tual property (including maintaining the latter should
be regarded as a species of ‘natural right’ (Parsi & Egan,
2002; Martin, Sorenson & Faunce, 2007), proponents of
thesetypesoftradeagreementsclaimthattheystimulate
investment and research. But they also appear to make
new medicines more unaffordable and create signiﬁcant
opportunity costs for governments seeking to develop
policies that assist the poor either by facilitating research
in or access to new health technologies.
This paper starts with the premise that an ethical ap-
proach to the access to innovative health technologies by
the poor requires that an international human rights-
based, transparent regulatory pathway be developed at
the international level. We will examine three alterna-
tivemodelswithaviewtoascertainingthemosteffective
way of achieving this global regulatory reform. Whilst
many such plans are now being promoted, these three
havebeenselectedbecausetheyinvolveafocusonvaried
aspects of the problem and take up different regulatory
mechanisms as solutions. This ﬁts well with our interest
in reform of global regulatory systems. In considering
the relative strengths and weaknesses of three strategies
for altering the approach to development of new health
technologies for the beneﬁt of the chronically poor, we
also keep in mind the practical beneﬁts and difﬁculties
of implementing such plans.
Background: The Global Regulatory
Architecture of Health Technology
Research
The need for policy change in the area of international
trade and intellectual property law so that they promote
research that better responds to patients’ needs and en-
sures equal access to innovations has been well detailed
(Carbone, 2003; Faunce, 2005; ‘t Hoen, 2006; Stiglitz,
2006a,b). Our argument is that the dysfunction of the
c u r r e n tp a t e n ts y s t e ma sac o m p o n e n to fg l o b a lr e g u l a -
tory architecture of health technology policy, is an out-
come of corporate decisions based on a simpliﬁed eco-
nomic theory whose dubious ethical status has received
insufﬁcient attention. Pharmaceutical companies direct
their research where they can make the most proﬁt, re-
gardlessofneed,sustainabilityandtherelativelong-term
value of that organisation or its products to society.
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health,
often lauded as a signiﬁcant step towards equity in the
trade and medicines arena, states that ‘trade agreements
should be interpreted and implemented to protect pub-
lic health and promote universal access to medicines.’
Section 2101(b)(4)(C) of the Trade Promotion Authority
Act 2002 (US) (TPA Act) even required US negotiators
to ensure that subsequent trade agreements uphold the
Doha Declaration (Gathii, 2002). Nevertheless, this has
largely remained a dead letter and even phrasing the
problem in terms of ‘access to medicines’ can be viewed
as endorsing a dependency on research in developed na-
tions as a necessary part of the solution.
General ethical and legal criticism can been levelled
that a long-term election cycle does not provide effec-
tive democratic control over international law-making148 • FAUNCE AND NASU
attheinitiativeofcorporate-inﬂuencedexecutivegovern-
ments, particularly in areas such as trade and medicines
(Henkin,1990).Theexpeditedinternationallaw-making
involvedinsealingtradedealsbysemiautonomousorga-
n i z a t i o n ss u c ha st h eU S T R( U n i t e dS t a t e sT r a d eR e p r e -
sentative closely associated with private industry), tends
to reduce the involvement of democratic legislatures
and an independent judiciary in the regulatory pro-
cess (Anonymous, 1993–1994). The formulation of the
US trade policies over the last decade, for example, has
involved minimal consultation with health agencies re-
gardingthehealthimpactofthepolicies.Interviewswith
USTR ofﬁcials have revealed that there is little evidence
that USTR consulted HHS or OGHA (Health & Human
ServicesOfﬁceofGlobalHealthAffairs)aboutthepoten-
tial impact on public health of speciﬁc pharmaceutical
provisions in FTA, although the HHS OGHA’s mission
includespromotingthehealthoftheworld’spopulation.
Further, the USTR receives counsel on speciﬁc sectors
and issues from 14 ‘trade advisory committees’ (‘t Hoen,
2006; MacDonald, 2006). Most of the committees have
nopublichealthrepresentation;thecommitteesonintel-
lectual property and chemicals each have just one mem-
ber appointed to represent public health interests, while
the intellectual property committee has ﬁve representa-
tives from the brand pharmaceutical industry, and the
chemicals committee has 10.
This aristocratic nature of international regulatory
law-making process led by an emerging transnational
capitalist class poses more serious threats to national
policy and law-making in developing countries (Allott,
2003;Chimni,2004).Morespeciﬁcally,theproblemscre-
ated for developing countries by bilateral trade agree-
ments limiting the exceptions to intellectual monopoly
privilege protection have been widely noticed (Abbott,
2005).
We now consider three widely differing approaches to
remedying such inequities inherent in the global regula-
tory architecture of health technology policy.
Alternative 1: Medical R&D Treaty
The model of a global Medical Research and Develop-
ment Treaty (Medical R&D Treaty) Treaty requires sig-
natorycountriestocommittospendingapredetermined
proportion of gross domestic product on medical R&D,
assetbytheWHO.ThismodelwasﬁrstproposedbyLove
andHubbardandabroadgroupofinﬂuentialacademics
asanalternativeframeworktoaddressneglecteddiseases.
Under the treaty, the aim is that R&D health technol-
ogy ﬁnancing becomes a globally shared responsibility,
thusatleastoutwardlyaddressingtheissueoffree-riding
by nations that spend little on health technology R&D
(HubbardandLove,2004).Byrewardinghealthtechnol-
ogyinnovationfromtheprizefundattheR&Dphase,the
treatyencouragesthepriceofthedrugtoimmediatelyfall
to the marginal cost of production (Hollis, 2006; WHO,
2006). This creates different markets for pharmaceuti-
cal R&D and for pharmaceutical production and distri-
bution, each potentially subject to different regulatory
arrangements.
The treaty includes minimum national ﬁnancial obli-
gations for supporting medical R&D. But each country
wouldbefreetofunditsrequiredR&Dcontributionwith
varying business models, including strong IP rights and
high prices, public funding or tax credits. Further, the
treaty would reward innovation directly with a system
whereby contributions to R&D on neglected diseases re-
ceive payments from a prize fund (Presma, 2005). The
size of the prize would be proportionate to the innova-
tion’s performance against evaluative criteria.
At the core of the proposed Medical R&D Treaty is
an obligation to ﬁnance Qualiﬁed Medical Research and
Development(QMRD).Thisobligationistiedtoacoun-
try’s GDP, either using different rates for each of four
income groups (high, high medium, low medium and
low),oragraduatedrate.QMRDwouldinclude(1)basic
biomedical research, including development of biomed-
ical databases and research tools; (2) development of
pharmaceutical drugs, vaccines and medical diagnos-
tic tools; (3) medical evaluations of these products; and
(4) preservation and dissemination of traditional medi-
cal knowledge. There is a separate obligation to ﬁnance
Priority Medical Research and Development (PMRD)
and two alternative methods of setting benchmarks for
PMRD.InthecurrentdraftatleasthalfofPMRDinvest-
ments must be targeted for neglected diseases.
Like Love, Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph
Stiglitz advocates the use of a medical prize fund as an
alternativetothepatentsystem(Stiglitz,2006b,p.1280).
In this case, the fund is even more speciﬁcally targeted
at spurring research and development into the so-called
‘neglected diseases’ that afﬂict people in the develop-
ing world, such as AIDS and malaria. Nonetheless, the
medical prize funded by advanced industrial nations, he
suggests, would ensure the best possible way of using
whatever knowledge we acquire, allowing for the power
of competitive markets to ensure a wide distribution at
the lowest possible price (Stiglitz, 2006b, p. 1280). The
beneﬁt of the prize system developed by Stiglitz is that
it reduces the desire of pharmaceutical companies to fo-
cus on incremental innovation, such as ‘me-too’ drugs
(whereinnovationresidesmoreintechnologicalchanges
and advertising than provable health beneﬁts), and to
push for real R&D breakthroughs in pursuit of a cash
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would allow for the production of generic medication at
cost prices.
Although this model relies on a quantiﬁable contri-
bution based on GDP, the Medical R&D Treaty model
does not implement protection measures against the in-
ﬂuence of the pharmaceutical industry with regard to
the discretionary allocation of prizes. Although Love has
highlighted the beneﬁt of ﬂexibility when determining
the value of a medicine, the greater the discretion of
the rewards authority, the greater is the opportunity
for the industry to undermine the intended function of
the treaty.
Thisproblemcouldperhapsbeaddressedthroughim-
plementing evaluative criteria based on objective prin-
ciples set out in the treaty. Yet implementation of this
model will require considerable amounts of information
to allocate prizes correctly, possibly in the form of an
internationalhealth informationnetwork. Althoughit is
unlikely that the signiﬁcant developments in health sys-
tems that would enable reporting on this scale will be
available in the shorter term, prize models are problem-
atic in any case as they do not provide a ﬁnancial reward
for a pharmaceutical company until the risk associated
with R&D has already been taken. Prize models may also
be inefﬁcient because they award prizes that are some-
times substantially greater than the cost of the R&D.
The prize fund model shares similar elements with
theAdvancePurchaseCommitment(APC)modelunder
which governments agree to purchase ﬁxed quantities of
drugs at predetermined prices if a company’s R&D is
successful, thereby creating markets for products, which
would otherwise be too uncertain to attract sufﬁcient
investment (Noehrenberg, 2006, p. 419). But the R&D
prize system, with its basis in government funding car-
ries considerable risks. Marlynn Wei expresses a primary
objection: ‘the administration would give rise to partial-
ity, arbitrariness, or even corruption—the dangers of all
institutions giving discretionary power to the adminis-
trators’(Wei,2007).Thisleadsmanydetractorstobelieve
that the devil is indeed in the details for the R&D prize
system, with much necessary components still unclear,
suchasdeterminingprizespendingandthevalueofprize
payments.
AstrengthoftheR&Dprizetreatyisthatindustrywill
alwaysbeattractedtoalargepoolofgovernmentmoney.
In this sense the model represents a continuation of the
carrot-on-a-stick approach to encouraging pharmaceu-
tical companies, which they have grown accustomed to
‘gaming’ for their own advantage. Proponents can point
to historical examples of such prizes as alternatives to
patents.Theycanhighlighthowaprizesystem(unlikethe
patentapproach)canbedirectedtovaluableglobalgoals
concerning reduction in the burden of disease (making
it more congruent with human rights norms). This pro-
posal has certainly attracted the most attention amongst
policy makers and scholars, which is a testimony to the
support it is receiving from well-connected activist in-
dividuals and organizations. Preventing corruption of
the processes by which the R&D goals are set and funds
allocated will be one of the biggest challenges for this
proposal if it is established. Which existing international
organization, if any, should act as administrator will also
be a possible source of controversy.
Alternative 2: Alternative to Patents
Health Impact Fund
Under this model, pharmaceutical innovators would
have the option to forego a conventional patent on a
new discovery and claim instead an alternative patent
(Pogge,2005)(orinlaterformulationsanonpatentclaim
(Hollis, 2008) upon a Health Impact Fund (HIF) that
would reward them, out of public funds, in proportion
tothehealthimpactortherapeuticvalueoftheirproduct.
Like the Medical R&D Treaty, this HIF model reorients
the direction of pharmaceutical companies towards ne-
glected diseases through the implementation of a prize
fund (Hollis, 2008). There are, however, many differ-
ences from the ﬁrst proposal discussed here. The ﬁrst
and possibly the most signiﬁcant is that pharmaceutical
patents are not directly threatened while pharmaceutical
companies are offered a new source of revenue from the
development of drugs for neglected diseases. This may
make the proposal at least initially more acceptable to
multinational corporate executives involved in this area.
UndertheHIFmodel,inordertoincreasethevalueob-
tained, innovators would seek to ensure their medicine
had maximum health impact through promoting the
construction or improvement of healthcare systems to
ensure that patients have the knowledge and motiva-
tion to use the medicines to optimal effect (Pogge, 2005;
Pogge, 2008). Further, generic brands would be encour-
aged and supported as this would further increase the
number of users with favourable impact on the global
disease burden. Rewarding pharmaceutical companies
for a product’s actual clinical effectiveness entrusts them
withﬂexibilityinchoosingthebesttherapeuticapproach
and encourages them to ensure appropriate use and dis-
tribution.TheHIFmodelaimstoremoveacrucialobsta-
cle to a dramatic reduction in the global disease burden
bygivingmedicalinnovatorsstableandreliableﬁnancial
incentives to address the medial conditions prevalent in
the developing countries (Pogge, 2006; Hollis, 2008).150 • FAUNCE AND NASU
Theﬁrstprinciplehereisthattheresultsofanysuccess-
ful effort to develop (research, test and obtain regulatory
approvalfor)anewessentialdrugaretobeprovidedasa
public good that all pharmaceutical manufacturers may
use free of charge. This reform is argued to eliminate the
second market failure (associated with monopoly pric-
ing powers) by allowing competition to bring the prices
of new essential drugs down close to their marginal cost
of production. The second principle (at least in initial
formulations) appears to be that, similar to the current
regime, inventor ﬁrms should be entitled to take out a
multiyear patent on any essential medicines they invent
but,duringthelifeofthepatent,shouldberewardedout
of public funds in proportion to the impact of their in-
vention on the global disease burden (Pogge, 2005). The
third component is to develop a fair, feasible and polit-
ically realistic allocation of these costs, as well as com-
pelling arguments in support of this allocation (Pogge,
2008; Hollis, 2008).
A problem with the practical efﬁciency of this model
will be that of designing and implementing a robust
means of assessing the comparative cost-effectiveness of
anewlydevelopedpharmaceutical.Itseemstohavebeen
envisaged that the pharmaceutical industry would retain
control over the direction of research. Like the Medi-
cal R&D Treaty proposal, the discretionary nature of the
HIF model requires an international health information
network to avoid gaming by pharmaceutical companies
who may attempt to exaggerate the health impact of a
new drug (Hollis, 2008; Ravvin, 2008).
The international dimension of this model could also
be called into question. The public funds to cover the
reward for invention come from taxpayers in developed
countries, while most of the beneﬁts from the inven-
tioncouldwellbeconsumedbythepeopleindeveloping
countries. It is arguable that some of the contributions
might be made up by lower health care and pharmaceu-
tical costs (Hollis, 2008). Despite the moral support that
itmayattract,theideamayconfrontdifﬁcultieswithob-
taining enough political support unless there is a wider
international cooperation. In this respect, it is worth ex-
amining the synergies of the HIF model with the Health
Technology Cost-Effectiveness and Competitive Tender
Treaty,towhichweturnourattentioninthenextsection.
Alternative 3: A Multilateral Treaty on Health
Technology Cost-Eﬀectiveness Assessment and
Competitive Tender
The ﬁrst two proposals examined here have sought to
overcome ethical problems with the direction of health
technology R&D outlined at the beginning of the paper,
by either providing a replacement of the existing patent
system (the Medical R&D Treaty) or an alternative to
it for a limited set of conditions related to health needs
of underprivileged populations (the HIF model). Both
involvethecreationofnewadministrativeinfrastructure
and its insertion into the global regulatory system for
health technologies.
Adifferentapproachinvolvesaggregatingandformal-
ising at the global level the existing networks of national
assessors scrutinising the safety and cost-effectiveness
of new health technologies, while supporting and ex-
pandingdomesticlegislativearrangementswherebygov-
ernments subsidise to citizens the cost of new health
technologies through centralised public-funded price
negotiation schemes involving closed-bid competitive
tender for therapies urgently required to meet iden-
tiﬁed public health needs. This Cost-Effectiveness As-
sessment and Competitive Tender model involves a
multilateral treaty establishing basic principles and pro-
c e d u r e sf o rp r i c en e g o t i a t i o n sb e t w e e ng o v e r n m e n t s( o r
UN agencies) and manufacturers of new health tech-
nologies based on expert assessment of safety and cost
effectiveness (Faunce, 2006).
Unlike the Medical R&D Treaty (Alternative 1 dis-
cussed above) it leaves the existing patent system intact
and does not require nations to allocate a large propor-
tionoftheirGDPtoasystemseveralstepsremovedfrom
their direct control. Unlike the HIF system (Alternative
2 discussed above) it does not require any alteration of
patent law (on early formulations of HIF) or require the
creationofinternationalpublicfundslargelycontributed
by developed countries. In this latter sense also it has ad-
vantages over the Advance Market Commitment (APC)
model where calculating in advance the amount of R&D
reimbursement is a major issue (Hollis, 2008).
WhattheCost-EffectivenessAssessmentandCompet-
itive Tender Treaty requires instead is a combination of
(1) formalisation in a multinational treaty of the basic
principles by which urgently required, new health tech-
nologiesareassessedforsafetyandcost-effectivenessand
then (2) linkage through the same mechanism with do-
mestic regulatory processes in which public funds are
allocated to subsidise expenditure by citizens on new
health technologies, for example by closed-bid competi-
tive tender.
One value of a Cost-Effectiveness Assessment and
CompetitiveTenderTreatyisthatstatesaremorelikelyto
commit themselves to facilitating a public goods agenda
in the area of medicines policy if they can convince
themselves that it is ﬁnancially responsible and does not
cut across existing intellectual property protections, or
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there is a chance they could be persuaded that such a
treaty merely moves to a global stage successful science-
based systems of equitably allocating public funds for
health technology purchase such as the Australian Phar-
maceutical Beneﬁts Scheme (PBS) and New Zealand’s
PHARMAC system (Faunce, 2007, Ch. 7). It is designed
toensurethatmarketsoperatemostcompetitivelytode-
liver the best community value on criteria of objectively
demonstrated therapeutic signiﬁcance. A political ad-
vantageoftheGlobalCost-EffectivenessAssessmentand
Tender Treaty is that central government price negotia-
tion on evidence-based criteria with the relevant patent
holder/manufacturer can be strategically presented as a
form of expenditure minimisation, or a ﬁscally respon-
sible way of obtaining community health value for pub-
lic expenditure. Increased tendering for active pharma-
ceutical ingredients and generic medicines will create
signiﬁcant savings in developing nation health budgets.
Post-tender,thewinningcompanywillhaveanew,larger,
marketshare,beabletobuychemicalsinbulkandexploit
economies of scale in production (OXERA, 2001).
Multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers may
well view any process of using expert assessment of pub-
lished cost-effectiveness evidence about their products,
particularly if linked with a competitive tender process,
as challenging the role of advertising and monopolistic
practices to control the marketplace to their advantage
under the ‘market fundamentalist’ philosophy outlined
earlier. One of their major counterarguments is likely to
be that such mechanisms (whatever their apparent value
intermsofdistributivejustice,globalethicsandinterna-
tional human rights) would allow foreign nations to free
ride on US research and development and so promote
high domestic US drug prices (Faunce, 2007b; Kolitch,
2006).Asa‘pull’mechanism,theycouldclaimitwillnot
be speciﬁc enough (unless globally endorsed through a
Treaty) to encourage their R&D to ﬂow in directions
required by the global burden of disease.
It could likewise be argued that repetition of tender-
ing rounds may increase the likelihood of market con-
centration if the same suppliers win contracts, so that
competitors let their expensive product licence expire.
Tendering may not only drive the price down rapidly
once a drug comes off patent, but also facilitate the exit
of unsuccessful generic suppliers from the market and
stall further price increases. While securing supply has
been a problem in isolated cases in New Zealand (where
thetendersystemisutilisedwidely),thisproblemtendsto
have been exaggerated by multinational pharmaceutical
interests (Faunce et al., 2006). Concerns that tendering
maycausedifﬁcultiesinplanningproductionforgeneric
manufacturers, would be minimised if the process in-
volved an open tender for generics below a government
set price, especially if it was linked to tax incentives for
companies to create head-to-head clinical trials of their
generic products against brand name and other generic
competitors, and a systematic program of physician
education.
For tendering contracts to function properly as a
‘pull’ mechanism for health technology R&D, enforce-
ablepenaltyclausesforfailuretodeliverorothercontract
default are crucial. The simplest of such clauses would
specifythatadefaultingcontractorshouldreimbursethe
relevant governmentpositivelistfortheextracostofob-
taining supplies from elsewhere. The contract between
the supplier and the relevant government should allow,
however, for some ﬂexibility in the agreed volume if de-
mand turns out lower than forecast, or a supplier fails to
deliver (Faunce et al., 2006).
This Cost-Effectiveness Assessment and Competitive
Tender Treaty model further differs from the prize fund
and HIF ideas previously discussed in that it aims to
enhance the global scope of fully mature regulatory pro-
cessesalreadyexistentinmanyjurisdictions(fewnations
currently have domestic prize fund or patent prize sys-
tems in place). It can provide a clear incentive system
for pharmaceutical manufacturers to seek to develop in-
novative medicines for developing world populations,
by providing a transparent pathway to a large pool of
mixed charitable, United Nations and domestic govern-
ment funds allocated to being spent, under a competi-
tive tender process, upon pharmaceuticals for otherwise
‘research-neglected’ diseases in the developing world.
Another advantage of the Cost-Effectiveness Assess-
ment and Competitive Tender Treaty model is that its
requisite involvement of experts in the regulatory pro-
cess will ensure that the whole process is less likely to be
captured by the multinational health technology indus-
try to its own advantage. The goal of a global framework
treaty on the principles and procedures to guide safety
andcost-effectivenessevaluationofnewhealthtechnolo-
gies could also be a more politically achievable one than
theearlierdiscussedproposalsifallthedifferentinterests
aretakenintoaccountandweighedinabalancedmanner.
Working out a road map toward such a treaty would in-
volvediscussionsaboutprinciplesonassessorreimburse-
ment (possibly a tax on global ﬁnancial transactions)
and liability protection, rationalisation of commercial-
in-conﬁdence protections, post-marketing surveillance
and performance indicators for conditional approvals
and strategies to obtain information on marginal cost of
production and price setting.
Once sufﬁcient ratiﬁcations of such a treaty have been
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shaped over time as ﬁrms compete to make large prof-
its by having their products placed on the treaty list
(Faunce, 2006, p. 8). Its carrot is to provide manufac-
turers and patent holders with potential access to a level
playing ﬁeld of large and reliable sources of domestic
fundingoncetheyhavemettherequisiteevidence-based
standards. Although the democratic deﬁcit inherent in
the international law-making will not be perfectly rec-
tiﬁed under this model, the involvement of experts in
the regulatory process will assist the likelihood that the
whole process will be more transparent and accountable
to global health needs.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to examine three different
approaches to driving a more positive agenda on ac-
cess to both essential and health innovative medicines
for the chronically poor. These range from an Medi-
cal R&D Treaty, an entirely new patent prize track and
a health technologies safety and cost-effectiveness as-
sessment treaty incorporating a closed-bid competitive
tender process for funds made available for neglected
diseases. The ﬁrst model seeks to replace the existing
patent-driven R&D model for health technology. The
second model seeks to establish a prize fund mecha-
nism whereby unique patents can encourage R&D for
neglected diseases. The third model leaves patent law
alone and seeks to formalise at the global level mech-
anisms of cost-effectiveness assessment and closed-bid
competitive tender for neglected diseases.
If previous trends continue, corporate interests and
the state bureaucracies beholden to them will strongly
oppose all three of the models discussed above. All three
proposals are now part of the published literature in this
ﬁeld. Which of such reforms is likely to be more in the
public beneﬁt, or more achievable, will be a matter to be
debated by academics, activists and policy makers. Yet a
sustainable world of more uniformly healthy people is a
visionofrespectforhumanityandhumandignityfound
in the international human rights system, but not yet in
global health technology regulation. In time it is to be
hopeditwillstarttomorethoroughlyandsystematically
infuse the international trade and patent systems. It is
hoped that the proposals discussed here will be viewed
in time as signiﬁcant contributors to this valuable end.
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